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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Estate of Jack King and Bonnie King (collectively the "Kings") hereby adopt
the statement of jurisdiction set forth in Dee Henshaw's ("Henshaw") Opening Brief.
(Br. at v.)1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue for Review
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Henshaw's

second Motion to Vacate: (1) where the motion to vacate was presented approximately
twenty-two months after the order it sought to vacate; (2) where the motion to vacate was
presented after the trial court had previously denied several post judgment motions
challenging the order and the order had been affirmed on appeal; (3) where the trial court
was prohibited from changing its prior order by the doctrine of law of the case; and (4)
where the defendants had standing to move for a directed verdict.
Standard of Review
A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a judgment is ordinarily
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin,
2000 UT App 110, If 8, 2 P.3d 451. This issue was preserved in the trial court by
Henshaw in his Motion to Vacate. (R. at 1259-1269.)

1

Citation conventions in this brief are as follows: "Br." refers to Henshaw's
Opening Brief, "Add. Exh." refers to an exhibit in the Kings' Addendum, and "R." refers
to the record on appeal.
1

STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representation from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2)
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions
of the transcript.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This case has infested the court system for nine years and involves a dispute

between the Kings and Henshaw over the use and ownership of water. The parties
disputed Henshaw's use and right to the water and Henshaw filed this action in July of
2000 to quiet title to his alleged water rights.

2

II.

Course of Proceedings
After years of pre-trial litigation, Henshaw's case against the Kings was heard

before a jury on April 17-20, 2006. At the close of Henshaw's evidence, the Kings
moved for a directed verdict dismissing all of Henshaw's claims. The court granted the
Kings' motion from the bench, and among other rulings, concluded that the evidence
failed to show that Henshaw acquired any right, title, and/or interest of Raymond Watrous
to Pine Creek water or any easement on the Kings' land.
On May 15, 2006, the trial court entered an Order and Judgment on Motions for
Directed Verdict which memorialized its ruling from the bench. That same day, Henshaw
sent an objection to the proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict to the trial court.
In response to the trial court's Order, Henshaw filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or
amend the court's directed verdict and then a Rule 60(b) motion for relief. The trial court
denied both motions and Henshaw then filed his first appeal to this Court.
On November 23, 2007, this Court issued an opinion affirming the trial court.
This Court held that Henshaw's appeal of the directed verdict was not timely and that the
trial court had correctly denied the motion to vacate.
Henshaw then filed a new Motion to Vacate the directed verdict on February 4,
2008, and, on July 18, 2008, the trial court denied the second Motion to Vacate because
Henshaw had not filed the motion within a reasonable time.

3

III.

Disposition in the Court Below
On July 18, 2008, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order

denying Henshaw's Motion to Vacate. The trial court ruled that a motion under Rule
60(b)(4) must be filed within a reasonable time. The trial court found that Henshaw's
Motion to Vacate, filed approximately twenty-two months after entry of the directed
verdict, after decisions on other post-trial motions and following an appeal was "simply
not timely because it was not filed within a reasonable time." (R. at 1393.)
The trial court found further that Henshaw raised the issue of standing at trial, in
his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed June 23, 2006, and in his December 2006
appellate brief In light of Henshaw's repeated argument of the issue, the trial court held
that delaying the Motion to Vacate based on standing until February 6, 2008, was
unreasonable and that the motion "should be denied as untimely." (Id.)
Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal on August 15, 2008, and this appeal followed.
IV.

Statement of Facts
As a preliminary matter, the Kings object to Henshaw's Statement of Facts to the

extent that it cites unsupported factual allegations set forth in documents such as
Henshaw's Complaint (R. at 1-16), Amended Complaint (R. at 467-481)., Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 738-775), and Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. at 780-821) as fact. The Kings
contend that any reference to facts related to the Pine Creek water rights should be based

4

on evidence that was properly offered and received at trial. However, where Henshaw
has not provided this Court with a copy of a complete trial transcript for the record, no
facts related to the evidence presented at trial may be properly cited on appeal. See,
Bevan v. J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983)(holding that in the absence of a
transcript, the appellate court presumes the trial proceedings were proper and judgment
was supported by the evidence.)
A.

Kings9 Motion for Directed Verdict

1.

This case was heard before a jury on April 17-20, 2006 in the Sixth District

Court in and for Wayne County, State of Utah. (R. at 1068; Add. Exh. 2 at pg.l.)
2.

At the close of Henshaw's case, the Kings moved the court for a directed

verdict dismissing all of Henshaw's claims. (Id.)
3.

The court ruled on the Kings' motion for directed verdict from the bench,

granting it in part and denying it in part. (Id.) The court dismissed all of the claims
asserted by Henshaw and the other plaintiffs in the Complaint and the Amended
Complaint. The court allowed amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence,
however, and allowed Henshaw to assert: (1) a quiet title claim that he owned water rights
in Pine Creek; and (2) a claim that he had an easement for a pipeline across the Kings'
land. (Id.)
4.

In its directed verdict, the court specifically found that:
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and
resolving all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show
5

that plaintiffs acquired any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous
to Pine Creek water or any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous
to any easement on the land of the defendants and the court directs a verdict
adjudging that plaintiffs acquired no right, title or interest of Raymond
Watrous to Pine Creek water or to an easement.
(R. at 1069-1070; Add. Exh. 2.1j 5 at pgs. 2-3.)2
5.

The Jury issued a verdict on April 20, 2006, which mirrored the court's

directed verdict. The verdict stated that Henshaw had failed to establish that he was
entitled to use water from Pine Creek or that he had an easement over the Kings'
property. (R. at 1011-1012; Add. Exh. 1 at Ht 1,3.)3
6.

Following the trial, the court directed the Kings' counsel to draft a proposed

Judgment and Order on the Motions for Directed Verdict which conformed to the court's
directed verdict and the jury verdict. Pursuant to this directive, the Kings' counsel
prepared and served the proposed Judgment and Order on Henshaw's counsel on May 4,
2006. (R. at 1068-1074.)

2

As part of the trial court's direct verdict, the court dismissed all claims asserted
by plaintiffs Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw. Accordingly, Dee Henshaw is the
only remaining plaintiff and appellant in this appeal.
3

In Henshaw's Opening Brief, he states as fact that "the jury found that [the]
Kings had in fact sold water rights to the Watrouses and that those rights were transferred
to Mr. Henshaw by the Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Mrs. Eenshaw and
from Mrs. Henshaw to [Dee Henshaw]..." (Br. at 5, 13 at % 24.) Henshaw cites the jury
verdict in support of this contention. However, the Verdict contains no such conclusion
and, in fact, expressly contradicts this contention. As set forth in the Verdict, the jury
found that Henshaw had failed to establish that he was entitled to use water from Pine
Creek. (R. at 1011-1012; Add. Exh. 1 atfff 1,3.)
6

7.

Upon the expiration often days from the date the proposed Judgment and

Order were submitted to Henshaw's counsel, the trial court's clerk presented the proposed
Judgment and Order to the court for signature. Having received no objection to the
drafts, the court executed the Order and Judgment on May 15, 2006. (R. at 1068-1074; R.
atll28;Exh.2.)
8.

On May 18, 2006, the trial court received Henshaw's Objection to the

Proposed Judgment and Order. The Objection was signed by Henshaw's counsel on May
15, 2006. (R. at 1128; Add. Exh. 4 at pg. 4.)
9.

Upon receiving Henshaw's Objection, and unaware that the court had

entered their Proposed Order and Judgment, the Kings filed a Reply Memorandum in
Support of Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order on Motion for Directed Verdict on
May 22, 2006. (R. at 1091-1099.)
B,

May 15, 2006, Order On Motions for Directed Verdict

10.

On May 15, 2006, the trial court entered an Order on Motions for Directed

Verdict (the "Order"). (R. at 1125-1130; Add. Exh. 4.)
11.

The court's Order conformed to the court's grant of directed verdict in

favor of the Kings and ruled that the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to
Henshaw, failed to show that Henshaw acquired Raymond Watrous' Pine Creek water
rights. (R. at 1069-1070; Add. Exh. 2 atpgs. 2-3.)

7

C.

June 19, 2006, Memorandum Decision and Order on Henshaw's
Objection to Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order

12.

On June 19, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and

Order in which it denied Henshaw's May 15, 2006, Objection to the Kings' proposed
Order and Judgment. (R. at 1125-1130.)
13.

The court's Order noted that it had received Henshaw's Objection on May

18, 2006, three days after it had entered the Proposed Order and Judgment, and that it
therefore considered the Objection to be untimely. (R. at 1128.)
14.

However, the court also stated that notwithstanding Henshaw's Objection,

the Kings' Proposed Order and Judgment accurately reflected the court's ruling on the
Motions for Directed Verdict as well as the Verdict rendered by the jury and the court
therefore overruled Henshaw's Objection. (R. at 1128.)
D.

Henshaw's Rule 59(e) Motion

15.

On June 23, 2006, thirty-nine days after the court entered its Order on

Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment, Henshaw filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter
or Amend the Court's Directed Verdict. (R. at 1131-1143.) In support of the motion to
alter or amend, Henshaw argued that Kings lacked standing to assert that Henshaw had
not acquired Raymond Watrous' rights. (R. at 1131-1141.)
16.

On September 13, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and

Order on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment denying Henshaw's Rule 59(e) motion on
the grounds that it was untimely. (R. at 1171-1174.)
8

E.

Henshaw's Rule 60flb) Motion

17.

On September 23, 2006, Henshaw filed a Motion for Relief Pursuant to

Rule 60(b) wherein he repeated his contention that the trial court erred in entering the
Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment. (R. at 1175-1188.)
18.

On November 14, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and

Order on Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion which denied the Motion. (R. at 1209-1214.)
F.

Henshaw's First Appeal

19.

On December 15, 2006, Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal in which he

appealed the trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict entered on May 15,
2006, as well as the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(b) Motion entered on November 15,
2006. (R. at 1215-1216; Add. Exh. 7.) In his appellate brief, Henshaw argued that the
Kings lacked standing to bring the motion for directed verdict.
20.

On November 23, 2007, this Court issued an opinion affirming the trial

court's decision, both as to the directed verdict and to the trial court's decision to deny the
motion to vacate the directed verdict. This Court held that Henshaw's appeal of the
directed verdict was not timely and that the trial court had not abused its discretion by
denying the motion to vacate. (R. at 1235-1246; Add. Exh. 7.)
G.

Henshaw's Second Motion to Vacate

21.

On February 6, 2008, Henshaw filed a second motion to vacate. The

motion challenged the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict dated May 15, 2006. (R. at

9

1259-1260; 1261-1270.) This was Henshaw's fourth post-judgment motion challenging
the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict4 and followed Henshaw's unsuccessful appeal
of the directed verdict and the order denying Henshaw's first motion to vacate.
22.

On July 18, 2008, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order

denying Henshaw's second motion to vacate. (R. at 1391-1395; Add. Exh. 8.)
23.

The trial court ruled that a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within

a reasonable time and found that Henshaw's motion to vacate, filed approximately
twenty-two months after entry of the directed verdict, after decisions on other post-trial
motions and following an appeal was "simply not timely because it was not filed within a
reasonable time." (R. at 1393; Add. Exh. 8.)
24.

The trial court found further that Henshaw had raised the issue of standing

at trial, in his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed June 23, 2006, and in his
December 2006 appellate brief. In light of Henshaw's repeated argument of the issue, the
trial court held that delaying the motion to vacate based on standing until February 6,
2008, was unreasonable and that the motion "should be denied as untimely." (Id.)
H.

King's Rule 11 Motion

25.

On February 22, 2008, the Kings served a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on

Henshaw arguing that Henshaw's second Motion to Vacate was presented for an

4

The previous three motions were the May 18, 2006, Objection to the Proposed
Judgment and Order; the June 23, 2006, Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Directed
Verdict; and the September 23, 2006, Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b).
10

improper purpose and asserted legal contentions that were not warranted by existing law.
(R. at 1329-1331). The Kings filed the motion on March 20, 2008. (Id.)
26.

On October 23, 2008, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and

Order on Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions denying the motion. (R. at 1452-1456.) The trial
court's decision included this admonition to Henshaw's counsel,
Nevertheless, counsel is strongly admonished and warned. In the
Memorandum Decision and Order regarding [the second Motion to Vacate],
this court held '[t]here can be no legitimate claim that standing is a new
issue.' The standing issue was raised at trial, again on Plaintiffs' Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment, and again on appeal. Vigorous advocacy is
admirable, but unless there is truly a good faith basis for actions in
litigation, such advocacy can cross the line and become discourteous,
costly, time consuming, and even uncivil to both the opposing party and the
court.
Id
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order on
Henshaw's second motion to vacate. The trial court properly denied Henshaw's second
motion to vacate because it was not presented within a reasonable time. Henshaw filed
the motion approximately twenty-two months after entry of the Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict and after challenging the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict in an
objection to the proposed order, a motion to alter or amend the order, a motion to vacate
the order and an appeal of the order to this Court. The trial court found that it was

11

unreasonable to delay raising the issue of the Kings' standing when Henshaw had raised
the issue in previous motions and in the appeal.
Furthermore, the trial court properly denied Henshaw's second motion to vacate
where it was required to do so by the doctrine of law of the case. The trial court's prior
rulings on the directed verdict, this Court's prior ruling on the directed verdict and finality
of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict restrained the trial court from changing its
ruling on the directed verdict.
Moreover, the trial court properly denied Henshaw's second motion to vacate
where the King had standing to move for a directed verdict. Henshaw had the burden of
establishing he had good title to the water rights in question including the rights held by
Raymond Watrous. He failed to produce any evidence that he had acquired those rights.
Thus, a directed verdict was correct. The Kings would have suffered a distinct injury if
Henshaw had prevailed on this issue and thus they had standing to defend against and to
demonstrate to the court that Henshaw had failed to meet his burden.
Finally, the Kings contend that they should be awarded their attorney fees incurred
in defending against Henshaw's frivolous appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

12

ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly denied Henshaw's second Motion to Vacate because the
motion was not timely, the motion was barred by the doctrine of law of the case and
because the Kings had standing to move for a directed verdict.
L

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HENSHAW'S SECOND
MOTION TO VACATE WHERE THE MOTION WAS FILED
TWENTY-TWO MONTHS AFTER THE ORDER HENSHAW
SOUGHT TO VACATE WAS ISSUED

Henshaw's second motion to vacate was time barred and therefore appropriately
denied. A Rule 60(b) motion to vacate must be made within a reasonable time and, if
based upon any of the first three reasons enumerated in the Rule, must be brought within
three months after entry of the challenged order. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2009). The Utah
Supreme Court has noted, "the Rules of Civil Procedure are so designed as to promote the
finality of judgments by an expeditious resolution of any post-judgment motions." Zions
First Natl Bank v. C est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980). Additionally,
"[rjule 60(b) seeks to balance the importance of finality against the desirability of
resolving disputes on the merits.... In keeping with the policy that 'there must be an end
to litigation someday', the rule imposes a one-year limit5 on motions that invoke clauses
(l)-(3)... .[M]otions invoking clauses (4)-(6) must only be made within a reasonable

5

While the Federal Rule has a one-year limit, Utah Rule 60(b) imposes a 3-month
limit. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
13

time." Cotto v. U.S., 993 F.2d 274, 277-2786 (1st Cir. 1993) {quoting Ackerman v. United
States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950))(other citations omitted).
Henshaw's motion argued that the directed verdict "is void as a matter of law."
(R. 1261-1269.) Although he did not so specify, Henshaw was apparently requesting
relief under Rule 60(b)(4) ("the judgment is void") and, thus, was required by the rule to
make his motion within a reasonable time. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (2009).
"What is a reasonable depends on the circumstances. Thus, a reasonable time for
purposes of Rule 60(b)(6) many be more or less than the one year [three month] period
established for filing motions under Rule 60(b)(l)-(3)." Cotto, 993 F.2d at 280.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of reasonableness under
Rule 60(b) and held that a sixteen month delay is "overlong in virtually any event." Id.
The court held that when the reason allegedly justifying Rule 60(b) relief was known
within two months after entry of the challenged order, "there is no valid excuse for having
dawdled an additional fourteen months before alerting the district court lo the changed
circumstances. Such protracted delay scuttles any claim that plaintiffs' motion was 'made
within a reasonable time.'" Id.; see also Planet Corp. v. Sullivan, 702 F.2d 123, 126 (7th

6

"Utah courts may appropriately look to federal case law interpreting related
federal rules for guidance in interpreting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Natl
Adver. Co. v. Murray City Corp., 2006 UT App 75, 131 P.3d 872, 876 n.9 {citing, State v.
Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, 95 P.3d 1193.
14

Cir. 1983)(holding that six month delay in bringing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion was
unreasonably dilatory.)
In this case, Henshaw waited twenty-two months after the order granting the
motion for directed verdict to bring his second motion to vacate. This is not a reasonable
time. Kings raised the issue of title to Raymond Watrous's water rights early and often in
the litigation. Kings first raised the issue in September 2000, just weeks after the
commencement of the action, and raised the issue several times in response to or in
support of pre-trial motions.
Henshaw questioned Kings' standing at trial in response to the defendants' motion
for directed verdict. Although the trial court did not make an express finding that "Kings
have standing," it implicitly recognized the Kings' standing when it granted their motion
for directed verdict. Henshaw again questioned Kings' standing in the June 2006 motion
to alter or amend the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. The trial court denied the
motion to alter or amend because it was not timely and, thus, did not expressly rule on the
standing question. Other than the frivolous character of the argument, however, there is
no reason why Henshaw could not have raised the question of standing in a Rule 60
motion within three months of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. For example,
Henshaw could have argued standing in the first motion to vacate (Henshaw's third postjudgment motion) in September 2006.
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After his unsuccessful Rule 59 motion, Henshaw then resurrected his standing
argument in his appeal brief filed with this Court in April of 2007. Inexplicably,
Henshaw waited until after this Court issued an opinion affirming the trial court's
decision to argue standing in the current motion to vacate.
Twenty-two months is a unreasonably long delay in almost any event. It is
certainly unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. For six years prior to the
motion for directed verdict, Henshaw knew of the Kings' contention that Henshaw had
the burden of proving title to Raymond Watrous's water rights. Henshaw concocted the
notion that the Kings lacked standing to move for a directed verdict as soon as they
moved for a directed verdict, yet Henshaw inexplicably waited twenty-two months and
then repeated the argument of lack of standing in his second motion to vacate. There was
no newly discovered evidence, there was no newly minted legal authority supporting
Henshaw's argument, there was no change in circumstance, and there was no explanation
of the twenty-two month delay. Henshaw made his standing argument at trial in response
to the motion for directed verdict. If he disagreed with the trial court's decision, his
remedy was a timely direct appeal which he failed to do. Simply put: Henshaw waited
too long.
.EL

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ON THE MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT IS NOT VOID

The Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is not void. The order, including the
portion of the order challenged by Henshaw, is valid. Even if Kings lacked standing (and
16

they clearly had standing), the jurisdictional defect would, at most, render the judgment
voidable, not void. Utah cases hold that a void judgment may be challenged at any time
and the "reasonable time" limitation of Rule 60(b) does not apply to void judgments. See,
e.g. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1992). However, Utah cases also
distinguish between void judgments and voidable judgments. Unlike void judgments,
there are limits on when a judgment which is voidable can be attacked.
It has long been the law that a judgment which is voidable cannot be attacked in a
collateral proceeding. Intermillv. Nash, 75 P.2d 157 (Utah 1938). Although this
limitation on attacking a voidable judgment is not measured in months or days, it is a time
limitation that is measured by procedural events.
The trial court denied Henshaw's latest motion to vacate because it was untimely.
The court found that the motion to vacate "filed approximately 21 months after the entry
of the directed verdict..." was not timely. (R. 1393; Add. Exh. 8.) The court also found
that procedurally it was unreasonable to challenge the order "after decision on other posttrial motions,... following an appeal" and after Henshaw has previously "argued the
issue of standing at the time of t r i a l . . . , in a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment...,
[and] in the plaintiffs' appellate brief." (Id.)
In Intermill, The Utah Supreme Court explained:
The courts, functioning to determine and settle property rights, upon
which persons may rely and the security of society be built, should
enjoy, in their formal pronouncements, every possible degree of
conclusiveness. To permit their determinations to be lightly regarded
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or easily evaded would render them nugatory, and be a source of
litigation and friction rather than to put an end thereto. That a litigant
may obtain relief against an erroneous or improper judgment, the law
has provided for him methods by which he may seek relief
therefrom, by appeals to the courts rendering it, or by review in an
appellate tribunal; or for matters rendering it invalid, which do not
appear in the record, or other proper circumstances, he may ask a
court of equity to set aside or annul the judgment. If he does not test
the soundness of the judgment by the methods law has provided for
that purpose, he cannot question or assail the same for errors in the
judgment, or the proceeding in which it was entered when in another
proceeding it is pleaded or produced in evidence against him. A
judgment, once entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, having
the res and the parties duly brought before it as provided by law,
imports verity, proves itself, and is invulnerable to attacks by any
indirect assaults. It can only be questioned in the manner and the
proceedings established by law. And since a judgment is established
and proved by the record thereof, unless an inspection of that record
establishes its invalidity, shows it to be void, the judgmenl is
conclusive and may not be questioned collaterally by any matters
dehors the record thereof.
Id. at 160-161 (citations omitted).
The Intermill court held that if "the court had jurisdiction of the res and of the
parties" the judgment is conclusive even if there were jurisdictional errors. Id. at 162163. A state trial court has broad subject matter jurisdiction. "The district court has
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted by the Utah
Constitution and the not prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (2009).
Henshaw's claims at trial were narrowed to two issues: (1) did he own water rights, and
(2) did he own an easement? These claims are clearly within the subject matter
jurisdiction of a district court. The parties were also within the jurisdiction of the court.
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Because the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, its order is
valid. An error of the type alleged by Henshaw, even if present, would only render the
order voidable, not void.
The California Court of Appeals explained the issue this way:
The term jurisdiction, used continuously in a variety of situations,
has so many different meanings that no single statement can be
entirely satisfactory as a definition. Essentially, jurisdictional errors
are of two types. Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or
strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine
the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the
parties. When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an
ensuing judgment is void, and thus vulnerable to direct or collateral
attack at any time.
However, in ordinary usage the phrase lack of jurisdiction is not
limited to these fundamental situations. It may also be applied to a
case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no "jurisdiction" (or
power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds
of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural
prerequisites. When a statute authorizes a prescribed procedure, and
the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has
exceeded its jurisdiction. When a court has fundamental jurisdiction,
but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely
voidable. That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and
a party may be precluded from setting it aside by principles of
estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata. Errors which
are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly, for
example by motion to vacate the judgment, or on appeal, and are
generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final
unless 'unusual circumstances were present which prevented an
earlier and more appropriate attack.
County of Los Angeles v. Harco Nat, Ins, Co,, 50 Cal. Rptr.3d 573, 577-578 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006)(citations and quotations omitted).
19

In Harco, the trial court entered summary judgment against the defendant. The
defendant failed to timely appeal the judgment and subsequently alleged by motion that
the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by entering summary judgment. The court of
appeals ruled,
Contrary to [the defendant's] argument, Judge Silvers did not lack
jurisdiction in the fundamental sense. She had a statutory basis for
the exercise of judicial power, which [the defendant] invoked by
filing the motion under section 1305.4. Again, if Judge Silvers
erred, an improbable conclusion given the record, her ruling should
have been challenged directly on appeal, rather than by way of
collateral attack after the judgment was final. Had [the defendant]
appealed in a timely fashion and if the voidable summary judgment
had been set aside on appeal, it would be as if it was never entered.
Id.
Federal Courts interpreting the corollary Federal Rule 60(b)(4), have held that
although the time limits stated in the rule do not apply to a challenge of a void judgment,
not every erroneous exercise ofjurisdiction renders the judgment of the court void. For
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled:
Rule 60(b) provides in part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representativefromfinal
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... (4) the
judgment is void." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4) (2000). Rule 60(b)(4)... is not
subject to any time limitation.
A judgment is void for Rule 60(b)(4) purposes if the rendering court
was powerless to enter it. A judgment may in some instances be void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, this occurs only
where there is a plain usurpation of power, when a court wrongfully
extends its jurisdiction beyond the scope of its authority.
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A court does not usurp its power when it erroneously exercises
jurisdiction. Since federal courts have jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction, that is, power to interpret the language of the
jurisdictional instrument and its application to an issue by the court,
error in interpreting a statutory grant of jurisdiction is not equivalent
to acting with total want of jurisdiction There must be no arguable
basis on which the court could have rested a finding that it had
jurisdiction.
Gschwindv. Cessna Aircraft Co., 232 F.3d 1342, 1345-1346 (10th Cir. 2000). See
also, Wendt v. Leonard, 431 F.3d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 2005)(holding that to preserve the
finality of judgments and to prevent litigants from circumventing the appeal process, the
concept of a void judgment is narrowly construed and will only be applied where the
jurisdictional error is egregious.)
Henshaw should have challenged the trial court's order directly on appeal if he
thought there was an error. He did not file a timely direct appeal of the Order on Motions
for Directed Verdict. Thus, that order "should enjoy . . . every possible degree of
conclusiveness." Intermill, 75 P.2d at 160. Instead, Henshaw has been permitted to
continue with seemingly endless litigation by concocting a meritless legal argument and
labeling it a jurisdictional question. Accordingly, Henshaw is at best challenging a
voidable order rather than a void one, and his inexcusable delay in this case is fatal to his
motion.
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III.

HENSHAW'S SECOND MOTION TO VACATE WAS BARRED BY
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Henshaw's Second Motion to
Vacate where the Motion was barred by the doctrine of law of the case. The Utah
Supreme Court has defined this doctrine as follows:
The "law of the case" is a legal doctrine under which a decision made on an
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same
litigation. The doctrine was developed in the interest of economy and
efficiency to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious
contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in
the same case.
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1035 (Utah 1995)(citations omitted).
The doctrine of law of the case applies to several "distinct sets of problems, each
with a separate analysis. Id. At least three iterations of the doctrine applied to bar
Henshaw's second Motion to Vacate: (1) the "mandate rule;" (2) the "prior ruling rule;"
and (3) the "final decision" rule. The Kings contend that each one of these doctrines
taken collectively or independently support the trial court's denial of Henshaw's second
Motion to Vacate.
A.

The Mandate Rule Bars Henshaw's Second Motion To Vacate

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the mandate rule,
[Dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on a legal issue in a
case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent
proceedings of that case. The lower court must not depart from the
mandate, and any change with respect to the legal issues governed by the
mandate must be made by the appellate court that established it or by a
court to which it, in turn, owes obedience. In addition, the lower court must
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implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account
the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces. The
application of the mandate rule lacks the flexibility found in other branches
of the law of the case doctrine
This serves the dual purpose of
protecting against the reargument of settled issues and of assuring
adherence of lower courts to the decisions of higher courts.
Id. at 1036 (citations omitted).
A corollary to the mandate rule is that,
[CJourts may give preclusive effect to a ruling that could have been
appealed, but has been abandoned by a failure to do s o . . . . "[T]he
whole point of the rule regarding abandonment of claims is to
require that all viable arguments be vigorously pursued throughout
the proceedings, thereby allowing for earlier decision, rather than
permitting parties to pick and choose which claims will be presented
on appeal and which will be held back until a later time."
In re Dep't of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litigation, 821 F.Supp. 1432 (D.
Kan. 1993) (quoting Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865
F.2d 320, 327 n.9 (D.C.Cir.1989)).
The mandate rule is consistent with the principle that
Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used to escape the consequences of failure
to take a timely appeal. In our adversary system of justice, each
litigant remains under an abiding duty to take the legal steps that are
necessary to protect his or her own interests. Thus, Rule 60(b)(6)
may not be used as a back-door substitute for an omitted appeal, and,
in all but the most exceptional circumstances, a party's neglect to
prosecute a timeous appeal will bar relief under the rule.
Cotto, 993 F.2d at 278.
Henshaw argued the question of standing in his first appeal. In response to
Henshaw's first appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's Order on Motions for
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Directed verdict. Accordingly, this Court rendered its decision and the mandate rule
prohibited the trial court from reconsidering its decision to grant the Kings' motion for
directed verdict.
Moreover, this Court did not expressly rule on the question of the Kings' standing
even though Henshaw raised the issue in his brief. (Add. Exh. 7.) However, this Court
did expressly rule that Henshaw's first Notice of Appeal was late and, thus, this Court did
not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict.
(Id.) This Court also held that the trial court correctly denied Henshaw's first Motion to
Vacate. (Id.)
In ruling on Henshaw's second motion to vacate, the trial court was bound by this
Court's first decision. Both the letter and the spirit of the appellate decision required the
trial court to give preclusive effect to its own Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. By
failing to timely appeal the trial court's order, Henshaw abandoned any claim that Kings
lacked standing to move for a directed verdict.
B.

The Prior Ruling Rule Bars Henshaw's Second Motion To
Vacate

Even in the absence of an appellate court mandate, the law of the case required the
trial court to respect its own prior ruling and deny the second Motion to Vacate. Under
the "prior ruling" branch of law of the case,
[A] court is justified in refusing to reconsider matters it resolved in a prior
ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and consistency. The
doctrine is not a limit on power but, "as applied to the effect of previous
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orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same case,
merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what
has been decided." Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct.
739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S.
605, 618-19 & n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391-92 & n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 318
(1983). It rests on " 'good sense and the desire to protect both court and
parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by indefatigable
diehards.'" In re Dep 't of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig, 821
F.Supp. 1432, 1434 (D.Kan. 1993) (quoting Wright § 4478, at 790). The
exceptional circumstances under which courts have reopened issues
previously decided are narrowly defined: (1) when there has been an
intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has
become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision
was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. United States v.
Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 862, 112
S.Ct. 184, 116L.Ed.2d 145 (1991); see GzV/mor v. Wright, 850P.2d431,
439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, Ct.App.J., concurring); Wright § 4478, at 790.
Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1036.
The trial court granted the Kings' motion for directed verdict despite Henshaw's
argument at trial that Kings did not have standing to bring the motion. Thus, the trial
court implicitly ruled that the Kings had standing.
Henshaw presented no exceptional circumstances that would have justified the
trial court granting the second motion to vacate and reopening the directed verdict. There
had been no change of controlling authority. There was no new evidence which had
become available which was not available at the time the motion for directed verdict was
granted. The trial court's prior decision granting the motion for directed verdict was a
correct decision. Both the trial court's express ruling that Henshaw had not acquired the
rights of Raymond Watrous and the trial court's implied ruling that Kings had standing to
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raise the issue were correct. The trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous and will
not work a manifest injustice.
Henshaw and his counsel could fairly be labeled "indefatigable diehards" who
have burdened the court and the parties with repeated reargument. Neither the trial court
nor this Court can countenance their belligerent tactics by considering Henshaw's second
motion to vacate filed after several post-judgment motions and an unsuccessful appeal.
It would not have been just for the trial court to re-open the directed verdict.
Henshaw and his co-plaintiffs produced no evidence that they had acquired Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water rights at issue in the case. Because the issue was decided
on directed verdict, the Kings introduced no evidence on the issue during their case in
chief. The issue was not argued to the jury or submitted to the jury for decision. The jury
did consider whether Henshaw had acquired the water rights allegedly owned by Mildred
Watrous (Raymond's co-tenant) and held Henshaw had no right to use the waters of Pine
Creek. Since the verdict, Jack King, one of the defendants, died.
The Court cannot now re-open the trial, allow additional evidence and argument
and submit the issue to a different jury merely on Henshaw's faint hope that a different
jury would render a different verdict.
C.

The Final Decision Rule Bars Henshaw's Second Motion To
Vacate

The third branch of law of the case applicable to the second Motion to Vacate is
the "final decision" rule. The law of the case doctrine provides that "when a legal
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decision is made on an issue during one stage of a case, that decision is binding in
successive stages of the same litigation." Jensen v. IHCHosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ^f 67,
82 P.3d 1076 (citations and quotations omitted). An exception to the law of the case
doctrine allows a judge to fix mistakes and reconsider prior rulings in the same case
before a final decision has been entered. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,
1310-11 (Utah Ct. App.l994)(emphasis added). The exception is inapplicable if a final
decision has already been entered. See, e.g. Vessey v. State, 2005 WL 3498367 (Utah Ct.
App.)7 The trial court could not revisit its decision to grant defendants' motion for
directed verdict because the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict was a final order.
"For an order or judgment to be final, it must dispose of the case as to all parties
and finally dispose of the subject matter of the litigation or the merits of the case. In
other words, a judgment is final if it ends the controversy between the parties litigant."
Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649, 651 (Utah 2000). The Order on Motions
for Directed Verdict, dated May 15, 2006, was afinalorder because, together with the
Judgment entered the same day, it disposed of the case as to all parties and all claims.
Together, the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment were the final
disposition of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case. They ended
the controversy between the parties.

7

A copy of this unpublished decision is found in the Kings' Appendix as Exhibit

9.
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Because the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict was a final decision, the trial
court no longer had the power to reconsider or change its decision when Henshaw filed
his second Motion to Vacate.8
IV.

THE KINGS HAD STANDING TO PETITION THE TRIAL COURT
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT

On appeal, and below, Henshaw has argued that the Kings lacked standing to
move for a directed verdict. Henshaw is mistaken. Standing is a requirement applicable
to plaintiffs, not defendants. Henshaw's argument to the contrary is, at best, incorrect.
More accurately, the argument is frivolous and wholly without merit.
As plaintiff in a quiet title action, Henshaw had the burden of proving that he held
title to the disputed water rights. The Utaih Supreme Court framed the rule as follows:
An action to quiet title to water rights is in the nature of an action to quiet
title to real estate. To succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a
plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the
weakness of a defendant's title or even its total lack of title. Likewise, in an
action to quiet title to water rights, a plaintiff must succeed on the strength
of his own title, not on the weakness of defendant's.

8

The fact that Henshaw couches his standing argument as a question of
jurisdiction does change the result. Although "lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the
court or either party at any time", A. J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Const. Co., 817 P.2d 323,
325 (Utah 1991), "the issue of jurisdiction must reach finality the same as any other
issue." Dairy Distrib., Inc. v. W. Conference of Teamsters, 294 F.2d 348, 351 (10th Cir.
1961). Thus, although Henshaw could and did raise the question of standing and
jurisdiction at trial and in his first appeal, the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction by
adjudicating the question of Raymond Watrous' water rights became a final decision that
could not be questioned at the time of the second motion to vacate.
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Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah
1983)(citations omitted.)
Thus, Henshaw could not prevail on the claim that he owned the disputed water
rights unless he proved that he held title to the water rights. As plaintiff, Henshaw had
the burden of proving that he held title to the water rights allegedly previously owned by
Raymond Watrous. Henshaw's burden was to "prove the strength of his own title". See,
Church, 659 P.2d at 1048-49. Title to the disputed water rights was part of the
Henshaw's prima facie case.
The status of Raymond Watrous' water rights was not a "claim" asserted by the
Kings or even an affirmative defense, because the issue did not raise matters outside of
Henshaw's prima facie case. See, e.g., Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v.
Dawson, 933 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996). If a plaintiff fails to prove an element of his prima
facie case, as happened here, or if the defendants successfully negate an element of the
prima facie case, the plaintiffs claim must be dismissed.
In this case, Henshaw's argument that defendants lack standing is misplaced and
inaccurate. Henshaw's argument is misplaced because title to Raymond Watrous' water
rights was part of the plaintiffs' case. Whether defendants had standing or not, Henshaw
was required to prove that he held title to the water rights. Henshaw failed to prove that
he had acquired Raymond Watrous' rights and the trial court properly directed a verdict
that he had not acquired those rights.
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Henshaw's argument is inaccurate because defendants had standing. Defendants
Jack and Bonnie King had standing because they "ha[d] or would suffer a distinct and
palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the case . . . " See,
Washington City Water Conservancy District v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125.
Notably, it was Henshaw that sued the Kings, not the other way around. Had Henshaw
succeeded in proving his claims, including his claim for damages in excess of 10 million
dollars, the Kings would have suffered a distinct and palpable injury.
There were three basic ways for the Kings to avoid that potential injury. First, they
could successfully controvert or negate Henshaw's claims and evidence. Second, they
could assert counterclaims or affirmative defenses which offset Henshaw's claims. Third,
as happened with the claim that Henshaw owned Raymond Watrous' water rights, the
Kings could avoid injury by demonstrating to the court that Henshaw failed to produce
evidence supporting his claim. Henshaw clearly failed to provide any evidence to the trial
court to support his claim and Henshaw has also failed to provide this Court with a
complete record in order to substantiate his claim or show evidence that would support
his claim.
A.

This Court Should Affirm The Trial Court's Directed Verdict
Where Henshaw Has Failed To Provide This Court With A
Complete Record On Appeal

Henshaw's contention that the Kings lacked standing to move for a directed
verdict is an unsupported, unilateral allegation which this Court cannot resolve. When an

30

appellant challenges a trial court's ruling on a directed verdict, "the appellant is obligated
to first 'marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."' Neely v.
Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, ^ 11, 51 P.3d 724. To facilitate this marshaling requirement,
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "[i]f the appellant
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to
the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) (2009).
This Court has held that when an appellant fails to provide it with a transcript of
the proceedings, it is unable to review the evidence and, therefore, "[it] can only presume
that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence." Horton v. Gem State Mut. of
Utah, 749 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(citation omitted).
In Horton, the trial court found that the appellant had breached the terms of an
insurance contract. Id. at 848. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's findings
and noted that the appellant had the burden of not only providing this Court with an
adequate record to preserve its arguments for review but also to marshal all of the
evidence that supported the trial court's findings. Id. at 849. This Court stated that
"because the appellant failed to provide us with a transcript of the proceedings, we are
unable to review the evidence and, thus, are unable to ascertain whether the trial court's
findings were based upon sufficient evidence." Id. This Court ruled that "[a]bsent the
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trial transcript, appellant's claim of error is 'merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation
which we cannot resolve.'" Id. (citation omitted).
In Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, \ 16, 17 P.3d 1110, the Utah Supreme
Court held that "[a]s an appellate court, our 'power of review is strictly limited to the
record presented on appeal.'" The Supreme Court noted that where the record in that case
contained only partial transcripts, it was without an adequate record and therefore "must
assume the regularity of the proceedings below." Id.
As in Horton and Gorostieta, Henshaw has failed to provide this Court with a
complete record that includes a complete transcript of the trial. On January 9, 2009,
Henshaw filed a partial transcript from the trial. This partial transcript includes only the
examination of one witness and the arguments on Kings' motion for directed verdict. It
omits the remainder of the proceedings at trial. Henshaw does not reference or cite the
transcript in his opening brief even though the brief includes an extensive recitation of
purported factual events. (Br. at 1-3; 9-11.) The Kings contend that the record is
inadequate in this case and that this Court "must assume the regularity of the proceedings
below." Gorostieta, 2000 UT 99, f 16.
As this Court stated in Horton, "[a]bsent the trial transcript, appellant's claim of
error is 'merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation which we cannot resolve.'" Horton,
794 P.2d at 849. In this case, absent a full transcript of the trial, Henshaw's challenge to
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the trial court's directed verdict is unsupported and incapable of being resolved on appeal
for lack of a sufficient record.
Moreover, even if Henshaw had provided this Court with a trial transcript, he
would fail to meet his marshaling requirement where there would be no evidence in the
transcript which would refute or call into question the trial court's directed verdict.
Henshaw has asserted that he could not marshal any facts because the trial court's Order
on Motions for Directed Verdict did not contain express "findings of fact." (Br. at 1112.) This assertion is mistaken on two grounds. First, the Kings contend that the trial
court's findings are themselves findings of fact. The fact there is no heading that reads
"findings of fact" does not mean the court's directed verdicts were not findings of fact.
Second, the court's Order clearly refers to the findings it made from the bench. (R. at
1068; Add. Exh. 2 at pg. 1.) As the Order states, the trial court made oral findings of fact
from the bench in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52. The fact that these
findings were made orally, only underscores the necessity of a transcript of the trial for
purposes of completing the record on appeal in accordance with Rule 11(e)(2).
V.

THE KINGS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES WHERE HENSHAW'S PRESENT APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS

The Kings are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure where Henshaw's appeal is frivolous. Rule 33 defines a
"frivolous" appeal as one that is "not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R.
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App. P. 33(b). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that a party's case is not frivolous
where the "brief as a whole is supported by the record and the [party] makes good faith
arguments that are adequately supported by case law, as opposed to a case in which the
record [is] devoid of admissible evidence." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, %
19, 104 P.3d 1208.
In this case, Henshaw's appeal is frivolous as defined by both Rule 33 and the
Utah Supreme Court. As set forth above, Henshaw's appeal is unsupported by the record
where Henshaw failed to provide this Court with a complete transcript of the April jury
trial as part of the record.
Henshaw's brief is replete with unsupported factual allegations such as the
contentions listed in paragraphs 1-11 of the Appellant's Statement of Facts, none of
which are supported by reference to trial testimony or exhibits. (Br. at 9-11).
Furthermore, Henshaw asserts that "the jury had found that Kings had in fact sold water
rights to the Watrouses and that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw . . . "
when there is no such finding in the Verdict or the Judgment. (R. at 1011-1012; R. at
1073-1074). The jury's verdict and judgment actually contradict Henshaiw's assertion.
The judgment states that "plaintiff Dee Henshaw is not entitled to use waiter from Pine
Creek." (R. at 1074).
Henshaw asserts that Raymond Waitrous died and that his interest in the disputed
water rights passed to Mildred Watrous. (R. at 19-20, 23-26.) The unproven assertion
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that Raymond Watrous died is essential to Henshaw's claim that he now owns the
disputed water rights and his argument that Kings are not "interested persons" under the
law. Yet Henshaw's brief includes no citation to evidence that Raymond Watrous died.
Henshaw's appeal is frivolous not only because of the utter lack of evidentiary
support. It is also frivolous because it lacks a good faith basis in law. Henshaw's
argument that the Kings, as defendants, lacked standing to defend against Henshaw's
claims or to negate elements of Henshaw's prima facie case is frivolous. Henshaw's
repeated assertion of the frivolous standing argument despite being overruled by the trial
court at least three time and by this court once, is in bad faith and designed to harass the
Kings or to needlessly increase the costs of litigation for the Kings.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Kings ask this Court to affirm the trial court's
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Henshaw's second Motion to Vacate.
Additionally, the Kings contend that they should be awarded their attorney fees where
Henshaw's appeal is frivolous.
DATED this /?*

day of July, 2009.
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.

4

^~

David R. W\Jiams i _3— 3
Anthony M. Grover
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
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April 20, 2006, Jury Verdict (R. at 1011-1012.)

Exhibit B

May 15, 2006, Order on Motions for Directed Verdict (R. at 1068-1072.)

Exhibit C

May 15, 2006, Judgment (R. at 1073-1074.)

Exhibit D

June 19, 2006, Memorandum Decision and Order (R. at 1125-1130.)

Exhibit E

September 13,2006, Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment (R. at 1171 -1174.)

Exhibit F

November 14, 2006, Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for
Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) URCP (R. at 1209-1214.)

Exhibit G

November 23, 2007, Utah Court of Appeals Decision: Hemhaw v. Estate of
King, 2007 UT App 378, 173 P.3d 876 (R. 1235-1246.)

Exhibit H

July 18, 2008, Memorandum Decision and Order denying Henshaw's
Motion to Vacate (R. 1391-1396.)

Exhibit I

Vessey v. State, 2005 WL 3498367
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EXHIBIT "A"

RECEIVED
APR 2 0 2006
OTHDIl
Cl£RK_

COURT

IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
18 South Main, Box 189 Loa, UT 84747
Telephone: 435-836-1301 Fax: 435-836-2479
i

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

VERDICT
Case No. 000600007

Plaintiffs,

Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee

vs.
JACK KING and BONNIE KING,
Defendants.

WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
Has the Plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence established that he is entitled to use
water from Pine Creek?
Yes

•

No

If you answered "Yes," then how much water is the Plaintiff entitled to use?
•

3 hours of water being the entire Pine Creek water every 18 days;

•

gallons per day.

Has the plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence, established that he has an easement
to connect a three (3) inch waterline to the six (6) inch waterline located on the
defendant's property?
Yes

•

No

ft

VERDICT, Case number 000600007, Page -2If you answered "No" to 1 and 3 above, then skip to the section dealing with Defendant's
claims.

5.

If you answered "Yes" to both 1 and 3 above, has the Plaintiff established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he was damaged when the defendants prevented him
from taking water through the three (3) inch waterline?
Yes

6.

•

No

D

If you answered "Yes," to 5, how much money will fairly compensate Plaintiff for the
damages sustained?
$

WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS
7.

If you answered "No" to 1, above, then do you find that title to the Pine Creek water
should be quieted in the Defendants?
Yes

•

Dated this 4 D _ day of April, 2006.

No

m

__^

.

.' /

Jury Foreperson

s

EXHIBIT "B"

RECEIVED
MAY i 5 ?006

Russell S. Walker, #3363
David R. Williams, #6686
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

) I S

^
6TH DISTpipyCOURT
CLERK.

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW
and DANA HENSHAW,
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JACK KING and BONNIE KING

Civil No. 000600007

Defendants.

Judge Wallace A. Lee

This matter came before the Court for a jury trial on April 17, 18, 19 and 20, 2006.
Plaintiffs Dee Henshaw, Dana Henshaw and Barbara Henshaw were represented by Charles A.
Schultz. Defendants Jack and Bonnie King were represented by David R. Williams of Woodbury
&Kesler,P.C.
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, defendants moved for a directed verdict dismissing
all of plaintiffs' claims and granting defendants' counterclaim to quiet title to Pine Creek water.
The court decided to grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part for the reasons stated
from the bench.
1

IT IS ORDERED
1.

Plaintiffs' claim for tortuous interference or interference with economic relations
is dismissed with prejudice based on the stipulation of the parties.

2.

Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed with
prejudice based on the stipulation of the parties.

3.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that the
defendants converted property of the plaintiffs and the court directs a verdict of no
cause of action on plaintiffs' claim for theft or conversion.

4.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that plaintiffs
Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw are entitled to recover on any claim against
the defendants and the court directs a verdict of no cause of action on all of
Barbara Henshaw's claims and a verdict of no cause of action on all Dana
Henshaw's claims

5.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that plaintiffs
acquired any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water
or any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to any easement on the land

2

of the defendants and the court directs a verdict adjudging that plaintiffs acquired
no right, title or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water or to an
easement.
6.

The court grants plaintiffs' motion to amend claims to conform to the evidence
and, therefore, dismisses plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract and claim for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with prejudice. Plaintiff Dee
Henshaw may present to the jury a claim that he is entitled to use water from Pine
Creek, a claim that he has an easement to connect a three(3) inch waterline to the
six(6) inch waterline on the defendants' property and claim that he was damaged
when the defendants prevented him from taking water through the six (6) inch
waterline.

7.

Defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the claim that plaintiff is entitled to
use water from Pine Creek, the claim that plaintiff has an easement to connect a
three (3) inch waterline to the six(6) inch waterline on the defendants' property,
the claim that plaintiff was damaged when the defendants prevented him from
taking water through the six(6) inch waterline and on defendants' claim to quiet
title to Pine Creek water against the claims of plaintiffs and their successors in
interest is denied.

3

At the close of defendants' evidence, plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on plaintiff
Dee Henshaw's claim that he is entitled to use water from Pine Creek, the claim that he has an
easement to connect a three (3) inch waterline to the six(6) inch waterline on the defendants'
property, and on defendants' claim to quiet title to Pine Creek water against the claims of
plaintiffs and their successors in interest. The court decided to deny the motion for the reasons
stated from the bench.
IT IS ORDERED
8.

Plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff Dee Henshaw's claim that he
is entitled to use water from Pine Creek, the claim that he has an easement to
connect a three (3) inch waterline to the six (6) inch waterline on the defendants'
property, and on defendants' claim to quiet title to Pine Creek water against the
claims of plaintiffs and their successors in interest is denied.

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of the forgoing ORDER ON
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT to the following by first class U.S. mail, postage
prepaid on this -o day of May, 2006:
Charles A. Schultz
222 West 700 South
BrighamCity, UT 84302
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EXHIBIT "C"

RECEIVED
6THDI!
CLERK

COURT

Russell S. Walker, #3363
David R. Williams, #6686
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358
Telephone: (801) 364-1100
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW
and DANA HENSHAW,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 000600007
JACK KING and BONNIE KING
Judge Wallace A. Lee
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for a jury trial on April 17, 18, 19 and 20, 2006.
Plaintiffs Dee Henshaw, Dana Henshaw and Barbara Henshaw were represented by Charles A.
Schultz. Defendants Jack and Bonnie King were represented by David R. Williams of Woodbury
& Kesler. Having heard the evidence and being fully advised, the jury entered a verdict and
based on that verdict, the Court orders, adjudges and decrees as follows:

1

WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
1.

Plaintiff Dee Henshaw is not entitled to use water from Pine Creek.

2.

Plaintiff Dee Henshaw does not have an easement to connect a three (3) inch

waterline to the six (6) inch waterline located on the defendants' property.
WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS
3.

Title to Pine Creek water should not be quieted in the defendants.

DATED this / 5 % a y of May, 2006.
BYTI

Judge Wallace
District Court Judged

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of the forgoing JUDGMENT to
the following by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid on this ^ ^ day of May, 2006:
Charles A. Schultz
222 West 700 South
BrighamCity, UT 84302

2

EXHIBIT "D"

RECEIVED
JUN 1 9 2006

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
Wayne County Courthouse
Loa, Utah 84747
Telephone: (435) 836-1301 Facsimile: (435) 836-2479

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 000600007
JACK KING and BONNIE KING,
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee
Defendants.

This case is before the Court for decision on the defendants' Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict. In addition, this Memorandum Decision will address the plaintiffs
Objection to the Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict.
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
This case was tried to a jury on 17-20 April, 2006. At the conclusion of the trial, the Jury
rendered a verdict which found the defendants had failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that title to Pine Creek water should be quieted in them. Thereafter, the defendants filed
a timely Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
Analysis of a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict requires the Court to
"look at the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, granting the j.n.o.v. motion only if this examination demonstrates that there is insufficient

HENSHAW v. KING, Case No. 000600007
Memorandum Decision and Order
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evidence to uphold the verdict." Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22, P6 (Utah 1999); see also
Eddy v. Albertson 's, Inc., 34 P.3d 781, 783 (Utah 2001); Collins v. Wilson, 984 P.2d 960, 964
(Utah 1999).
In this case, the evidence established that in consideration of payment in the amount of
$1,500.00, the defendants executed a water deed to Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Watrous with the
intent of conveying water to the Watrouses for use on property owned by the Watrouses. Later,
the Watrouses sold their property to the plaintiff. However, neither the Watrouses nor the
plaintiff ever perfected a water right based on the water deed by filing an application for a change
in the point of diversion with the Utah State Engineer.
In addition, extensive evidence established a clear course of conduct between the
defendants, the Watrouses, and the plaintiff, in which the defendants acquiesced in use of Pine
Creek water by the Watrouses and the plaintiff, on the plaintiffs property. Such use continued
each year for a period in excess of twenty (20) years, because the defendants, and everyone else
concerned, believed the defendants had sold the water by virtue of the water deed to Mr. and
Mrs. Watrous.
Finally, during the trial, Kirk Forbush, Regional Engineer, testified that because neither
the Watrouses nor the plaintiff perfected the water conveyed by the water deed, the plaintiff
acquired no right recognized or documented in records of the office of the State Engineer.
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However, Mr. Forbush also testified that failure to perfect the water acquired under the water
deed did not invalidate the water deed or the sale of the water to Mr. and Mrs. Watrous.
From all the evidence presented at the trial, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it was reasonable for the Jury to conclude that the plaintiff acquired no
recognizable right to use Pine Creek water because of failure to perfect the water acquired from
the defendants in the water deed.
However, it was also reasonable for the Jury to conclude that because the defendants
freely admit they sold Pine Creek water to the Watrouses, and because thereafter, they acquiesced
in use of Pine Creek water by the Watrouses and the plaintiff (as successor in interest to Mr. and
Mrs. Watrous) for a period in excess of twenty (20) years, the defendants should not now be able
to disavow that sale and to retake water they admittedly sold simply because the Watrouses failed
to take the steps necessary to perfect their right to divert and use the water. The fact that the
Jury's verdict leaves the issue somewhat unsettled does not undermine the credibility of the
verdict.
On this basis, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds
sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict of the Jury. The defendants' Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict is denied.
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PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND PROPOSED ORDER
Following the trial, the Court directed counsel for the defendants to draft a proposed
Judgment based on the Jury's verdict and a proposed Order, regarding the Court's ruling on the
parties' respective Motions for Directed Verdict. Counsel for the defendants complied with the
Court's directive, and circulated a proposed Judgment and Order to counsel for the plaintiff for
approval on or about 4 May 2006.
At the conclusion often (10) days from the date the drafts were submitted to counsel for
the plaintiff, the Clerk presented the proposed Judgment and Order to the Court for signature.
Having received no objection to the drafts, the Court executed the Judgment and Order on 15
May 2006.
On 18 May 2006, the Clerk of the Court received the plaintiffs Objection to the proposed
Judgment and Order. The Objection was signed by counsel for the plaintiffs on 15 May 2006.
On this basis, the Court finds the plaintiffs Objections are not timely. Nevertheless, the
Court also finds the Judgment and Order prepared by counsel for the defendant to accurately
reflect the Court's ruling on the Motions for Directed Verdict, as well as the Verdict rendered by
the Jury in this case.
Therefore, the plaintiffs objection to both documents is overruled.
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EXHIBIT "E"

RECEIVED
SEP 1 3 2006
6THDisraiqr COURT

CLERK.

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JACK KING and BONNIE KING,
Case No. 000600007
Defendants.
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee

On 27 June 2006, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. The
Motion is accompanied by a Memorandum. Neither the plaintiffs' Motion nor their
Memorandum refers to any rule as the basis for the Motion. Therefore, the Court construes the
plaintiffs' Motion as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 59(e).
Despite the title of their Motion, the plaintiffs' argument appears to center around the
Court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict rather than the Judgment itself. However, the
Court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is a judgment of the Court under the definition of
"judgment" contained in Rule 54(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because it is an order from
which an appeal lies.
Under Rule 59(e), "a motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than
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10 days after entry of the judgment." Both the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the
Judgment were entered in this case on 15 May 2006. The plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend
the Judgment is untimely under Rule 59(e) because it was served more than a month after the
entry of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment.
In their memorandum in support of the motion, the plaintiffs explain that they failed to
file their motion on time because they did not receive a copy of the executed Order1. The Court
cannot independently determine whether this is correct because the file does not contain any
certificate of service indicating the plaintiffs were ever sent a copy of the executed Order. The
plaintiffs argue that it was the defendants' responsibility to serve a copy of the executed Order
on the plaintiffs.
Regardless, the language of Rule 59(e) is clear that a motion to alter or amend the
judgment must be filed within ten (10) days after entry of the judgment, as opposed to notice of
entry of the judgment. Therefore, the plaintiffs' Motion is untimely and should not be
considered by the Court. The Motion is denied.

By their own assertion, the plaintiffs learned about the execution of the Order from this Court's decision
on 19 June 2006.
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RECEIVED
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RELIEF
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) URCP

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JACK KING and BONNIE KING,
Case No. 000600007
Defendants.
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The defendants responded; and the plaintiffs replied. The motion is now submitted
for a decision.
The plaintiffs seek to vacate the directed verdict entered by the Court on 15 May 2006.
The plaintiffs raise the following grounds for requested relief: (1) the Court erred in entering the
directed verdict prematurely without considering the plaintiffs' objections in violation of Rule
7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the defendants failed to notify the plaintiffs that
the directed verdict had been signed by the Court as required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 58A(d).
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Under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court has authority and discretion to relieve a party from a final
judgment "for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The Court
considers whether the grounds advanced by the plaintiffs are sufficient to justify such relief.
ANALYSIS
1.

Alleged Violation of Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
This Court previously considered the plaintiffs' objections to the proposed Order

regarding the parties' Motions for Directed Verdict in its Memorandum Decision and Order
dated 19 June 2006. In that Decision and Order, this Court did find the plaintiffs' objections
were not timely, but, notwithstanding the untimeliness of the objections, the Court still
considered the objections and specifically found "the Judgment and Order prepared by counsel
for the defendant to accurately reflect the Court's ruling on the Motions for Directed Verdict, as
well as the Verdict rendered by the Jury in this case." On this basis, the plaintiffs' objections
were overruled.
Regardless, the Court finds that by its terms, Rule 7(f)(2) is binding only upon counsel
and not upon the trial court. See Tolboe Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co.,
682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984).
In Tolboe, the Supreme Court analyzed Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the United
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States District Court for the District of Utah1, which, at the time, provided that the notice of
objections to the proposed order '"shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after the service of proposed order on the opposing counsel."
The plaintiff in that case argued that Rule 2.9 was violated because the court had signed
the proposed order a day after it was served upon the opposing counsel. Id. at 848. Thus, the
plaintiff maintained it was denied an opportunity to object, and moved the court to vacate the
order. Id. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs argument was without merit because Rule
2.9 was binding only upon counsel and not upon the trial court. Id. at 849.
The requirement of Rule 7(f)(2)2 is similar to the requirement of Rule 2.9 described
above. Therefore, similar analysis applies.
The Court declines to vacate the Order regarding the Directed Verdict on this ground.
2.

Alleged Violation of Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
The plaintiffs' request to vacate the directed verdict on this ground should also be denied.

1

Today the requirements of this rule are in Rule 54-1(b) of the Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, withinfifteendays after the court's decision, serve upon
the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be
filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
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The plaintiffs claim they did not receive proper notice of entry of the judgment from the
defendants as required by Rule 58A(d). Generally, to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) for
lack of notice about a judgment, a moving party must demonstrate "diligence in trying to
determine whether judgment had been entered" or that the moving party was 'actually misled . . .
whether there had been entry of judgment." Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 68 P.3d
1008, 1010-11 (Utah App. 2003). See also Hawley v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2005 UT App
368.
In this case, the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating any efforts to learn about
entry of the judgment. Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs were not diligent enough
in trying to determine whether the judgment had been entered.
Similarly, the only evidence the plaintiffs advance in an attempt to prove they were
misled to believe that the judgment had not been entered in this case is the plaintiffs' statement
that the defendants responded to their objections to the proposed order instead of notifying them
about entry of the order and judgment.
The case file shows that the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment
were signed and entered by the Court on 15 May 2006. The plaintiffs signed their Objections to
the proposed order and judgment on 15 May 2006, and they were received by the Court on 18
May 2006. The defendants5 Reply to the plaintiffs' Objections was signed on 19 May 2006; and
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stamped by the clerk on 22 May 2006.
Based on these dates, the Court may only speculate whether the defendants' counsel knew
about entry of the judgment on 19 May 2006 when he signed and mailed the Reply. The plaintiffs
have produced no evidence to convince this Court that Counsel for the defendants had actual
knowledge of the judgment and intentionally failed to notify the plaintiffs about it.
Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to produce facts sufficient to
demonstrate that they were diligent in trying to learn about entry of the judgment or that they
were actually misled to believe that no judgment had been entered.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' request for Rule 60(b) relief on this ground is also denied.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The plaintiffs' Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) URCP is denied.

DATED this /fflS

day of

\JB\}W*{«*<

WALLACE A. LEE, Judgi
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173P.3d876
173 P.3d 876, 592 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2007 UT App 378
(Cite as: 173 P.3d 876)

H

Page 1

(4) owners were not entitled to attorney fees under
rule providing for such fees for frivolous appeals.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dee HENSHAW, Barbara Henshaw, and Dana
Henshaw, Plaintiffs and Appellant,
v.
ESTATE OF Jack KING and Bonnie King, Defendants and Appellees.
No.20061175-CA.

Gregory K. Orme, J., concurred in part, and concurred in result in part.

Nov. 23, 2007.

West Headnotes

Background: Homeowner brought action against
neighboring property owners, alleging breach of
contract, tortious interference, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, theft or conversion, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, after owners placed gate valve on
waterline that prevented homeowner from obtaining
water from creek. Owners filed counterclaim seeking to quiet title in disputed water rights. At the
close of homeowner's evidence, owners moved for
directed verdict. The Sixth District Court, Loa Department, Wallace A. Lee, J., granted motion in
part, entered judgment on jury verdict finding that
homeowner failed to establish that he was entitled
to water from creek, and that title to water rights
should not be quieted in owners, and, thereafter,
denied homeowner's motion for relief from judgment. Homeowner appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McHugh, J., held
that:
(1) homeowner's motion to alter or amend judgment
did not extend period for filing notice of appeal;
(2) trial court's signing of proposed judgment and
order prior to expiration of five-day period for
homeowner to object did not violate rule governing
procedure for service and filing of proposed orders;
(3) homeowner was not entitled to relief from judgment based on alleged failure to receive notice of
entry of judgment; and

Affirmed.

[1] Appeal and Error 30 €>^>927(7)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k927 Dismissal, Nonsuit, Demurrer to
Evidence, or Direction of Verdict
30k927(7) k. Effect of Evidence and
Inferences Therefrom on Direction of Verdict. Most
Cited Cases
In reviewing a grant of a directed verdict, appellate
court views all facts and the inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
[2] Appeal and Error 30 €^>866(3)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k866 On Appeal from Decision on
Motion for Dismissal or Nonsuit or Direction of
Verdict
30k866(3) k. Appeal from Ruling
on Motion to Direct Verdict. Most Cited Cases
Appeal and Error 30 €=^927(7)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
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30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k927 Dismissal, Nonsuit, Demurrer to
Evidence, or Direction of Verdict
30k927(7) k. Effect of Evidence and
Inferences Therefrom on Direction of Verdict. Most
Cited Cases
Appellate court will reverse a directed verdict when
the evidence, viewed in light most favorable to the
nonmovant, is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury
to find for the nonmovant.
[3] Appeal and Error 30 €^>982(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k982 Vacating Judgment or Order
30k982(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Judgment 228 C=>344
228 Judgment
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k344 k. Discretion of Court. Most Cited
Cases
Trial court has discretion in determining whether a
movant has shown grounds for relief from judgment and appellate court will reverse the trial
court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of
discretion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).
[4j Appeal and Error 30 €=^428(2)
30 Appeal and Error
30 VII Transfer of Cause
30VII(D) Writ of Error, Citation, or Notice
30k428 Filing Notice and Proof of Service
30k428(2) k. Time for Filing. Most
Cited Cases
Homeowner's motion to alter or amend judgment
did not extend period for filing notice of appeal
from judgment finding that homeowner failed to establish that he had easement to connect his waterline to neighboring property owners' waterline for
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purposes of irrigating his property, as motion was
not timely, in that it was not filed within ten days of
judgment. Rules App.Proc, Rule 4(a), (b)(1)(C);
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(e).
[5] Appeal and Error 30 €^>356
30 Appeal and Error
30VI1 Transfer of Cause
30VII(A) Time of Taking Proceedings
30k356 k. Effect of Delay or Failure to
Take Proceedings. Most Cited Cases
If an appeal is not timely filed, appellate court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
[6] Courts 106 € ^ 4 0
106 Courts
1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction
in General
106k40 k. Acts and Proceedings Without Jurisdiction. Most Cited Cases
When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction, it
retains only the authority to dismiss the action.
[7] Appeal and Error 30 €=>876
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(B) Interlocutory, Collateral, and Supplementary Proceedings and Questions
30k876 k. On Appeal from Order Enforcing, Vacating, or Modifying, or Refusing to Enforce, Vacate, or Modify Previous Judgment or Order. Most Cited Cases
When an order on a motion for relief from judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, excusable
neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud is appealable, the appeal is narrow in scope and addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of
relief; the appeal does not, at least in most cases,
reach the merits of the underlying judgment from
which relief was sought. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).
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[8] Judgment 228 €^>232

tion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).

228 Judgment
228VI On Trial of Issues
228VI(A) Rendition, Form, and Requisites in
General
228k232 k. Defects and Objections. Most
Cited Cases

[10] Judgment 228 €=>276
228 Judgment
22 8VII Entry, Record, and Docketing
228k276 k. Proceedings for Entry. Most
Cited Cases

Judgment 228 €=^282

Motions 267 €===>56(1)

228 Judgment
228VII Entry, Record, and Docketing
228k277 Judgment Roll or Record
228k282 k. Signature. Most Cited Cases
Trial court's signing of neighboring property owners' proposed judgment and order prior to expiration of five-day period for homeowner to object set
forth in rule governing procedure for service and
filing of proposed orders did not violate rule, in
context of homeowner's action against property
owners over disputed water rights, as nothing in
rule required court to wait for expiration of party's
objection period prior to signing a proposed judgment or order, and homeowner was not prejudiced
by timing of court's signing of proposed judgment
and order, as court subsequently ruled that
homeowner's objections to proposed judgment and
order were untimely, but then addressed merits of
objections. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 7(f)(2).

267 Motions
267k56 Entry or Filing of Orders
267k56(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Rules pertaining to the entry of proposed judgments
and orders are binding only on the litigants and not
on the trial court.

[9] Appeal and Error 30 €^>982(2)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k982 Vacating Judgment or Order
30k982(2) k. Refusal to Vacate. Most
Cited Cases
To succeed on appeal from denial of a motion for
relief from judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud, appellant must show that the trial
court exceeded its discretion by denying his mo-

[11] Judgment 228 € ^ 3 4 3
228 Judgment
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k343 k. Right to Relief in General. Most
Cited Cases
Judgment 228 0 ^ 3 6 0
228 Judgment
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k353 Errors and Irregularities
228k360 k. Irregularities in Entry of Judgment. Most Cited Cases
Homeowner was not entitled to relief from judgment under catchall provision of rule governing relief from judgment for any other reason justifying
relief from operation from judgment, based on alleged failure to receive notice of entry of judgment,
in context of homeowner's action against property
owners over disputed water rights, as there was
evidence that homeowner received timely notice of
proposed judgment and order, he knew that he had
only five days in which to object to proposed judgment and order, and there was no evidence that trial
court or property owners misled homeowner in any
way. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(6).
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228 Judgment
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k343 k. Right to Relief in General. Most
Cited Cases

275kll6.3 k. Compliance with Requirements. Most Cited Cases
Burden is on counsel to check periodically with the
clerk of the court as to the date of entry of the findings and judgment so that post-trial motions may be
timely filed.

Judgment 228 C==>360

[14] Costs 102 €==>260(5)

228 Judgment
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k353 Errors and Irregularities
228k360 k. Irregularities in Entry of Judgment. Most Cited Cases
Moving parties on motion for relief from judgment
under catchall provision of rule governing such relief for any other reason justifying relief from operation from judgment, asserting that they had no notice of the trial court's judgment, must show either
diligence in trying to determine whether judgment
had been entered, or that they were actually misled
as to whether there had been entry of judgment.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(6).

102 Costs
102X On Appeal or Error
102k259 Damages and Penalties for Frivolous Appeal and Delay
102k260 Right and Grounds
102k260(5) k. Nature and Form of
Judgment, Action, or Proceedings for Review. Most
Cited Cases
Property owners were not entitled to attorney fees
under rule providing for such fees for frivolous appeals, as homeowner's challenge to denial of his
motion for relief from judgment was not wholly
without merit, in context of homeowner's action
against property owners over disputed water rights.
Rules App.Proc, Rule 33(b).

[13] Judgment 228 € ^ 3 2 1
[15] Appeal and Error 30 €^>766
228 Judgment
228VIII Amendment, Correction, and Review in
Same Court
228k321 k. Time for Application. Most Cited
Cases
Judgment 228 €=>386(1)
228 Judgment
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k3 86 Time for Application
228k386(l) k. In General. Most Cited
New Trial 275 €=> 116.3
275 New Trial
275III Proceedings to Procure New Trial
275k 115 Time for Application
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30 Appeal and Error
30X11 Briefs
30k766 k. Defects, Objections, and Amendments. Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals would not address on appeal issue
of whether homeowner was entitled to attorney fees
on grounds he prevailed on neighboring property
owners' quiet title claim, and that owners violated
pleading rule, in context of homeowner's action
against property owners over disputed water rights,
as homeowner failed to adequately brief the issue.
Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9); Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 11.
*878 Charles A. Schultz, Brigham City, for Appellant.
David R. Williams and Anthony M. Grover, Salt
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Lake City, for Appellees.
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., McHUGH,
and ORME, JJ.

OPINION
McHUGH, Judge:
K 1 Plaintiff Dee Henshaw ™ appeals the *879
trial court's grant of Defendants Jack FN2 and Bonnie King's motion for directed verdict and the trial
court's denial of Henshaw's motion brought under
rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We
affirm.
FN1. The complaint also lists Barbara
Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs
in the action. The trial court subsequently
concluded, however, that Barbara and
Dana Henshaw did not have any claims
against the Kings. Neither Barbara nor
Dana appealed that ruling. Consequently,
we reference only Dee Henshaw as the
plaintiff in this appeal.
FN2. Jack King died while this appeal was
pending, and therefore the Estate of Jack
King is Bonnie King's codefendant on appeal. As a convenience to the reader, we
refer to Defendants collectively as the Kings.

BACKGROUND
f 2 The Kings own real property in Wayne County,
Utah, which includes certain water rights for irrigation from a nearby waterway known as Pine Creek.
Several years ago, the Kings sold a portion of their
water rights to their neighbors, Raymond and Mildred Watrous. These rights were conveyed in a water deed. In July 1992, Barbara Henshaw purchased

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West.
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the Watrouses' home and moved onto the property.
Barbara Henshaw used the water rights just as the
Watrouses had, and without any problem, for approximately eight years. Barbara conveyed her
home to her son, Dee Henshaw, in August 2003.
1f 3 The current dispute over the water rights began
in 2000 when, according to the Kings, Dee Henshaw began using more water than was originally
allocated to the Watrouses. Eventually, the Kings
placed a gate valve on the waterline and prevented
Henshaw from obtaining water from Pine Creek. As
a result, Henshaw filed the present action alleging
breach of contract, tortious interference, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, theft or
conversion, harassment,FN3 and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Kings filed an answer, which alleged that Henshaw had no water
rights, and a counterclaim asking the trial court to
quiet title in the disputed water rights to the Kings.
FN3. Henshaw dropped the harassment
claim in an amended complaint.
1f 4 The case proceeded to trial, which occurred
from April 17 to April 20, 2006. At the close of
Henshaw's evidence, the Kings moved for a directed verdict. Ruling from the bench, the trial court
granted the motion in part, dismissing with prejudice Henshaw's claims of tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of
contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The court also held that Henshaw
had no cause of action against the Kings for theft or
conversion. The trial court then "directed] a verdict adjudging that [Henshaw] acquired no right,
title or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek
water or to an easement [on the Kings' land]" because "the evidence failed to show" that Henshaw
acquired such rights through Raymond Watrous.
f 5 At the close of the Kings' evidence, Henshaw
also filed a motion for directed verdict, which the
trial court denied. Again ruling from the bench, the
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trial court determined that Henshaw would be able
to present to the jury his claims that he is entitled to
use water from Pine Creek, that he has an easement
to connect a three-inch waterline to the Kings' sixinch waterline, and that the Kings' claim to quiet
title to the water rights should be denied.FN4
FN4. It is unclear from the trial court's order on the motions for directed verdict
whether Henshaw's claim to an easement
and water rights presented to the jury was
independent of the Raymond Watrous interest, and the trial court's ruling from the
bench is not part of the record on appeal.
K 6 On April 20, 2006, the jury returned a verdict
which determined that Henshaw had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
entitled to use water from Pine Creek and that he
had an easement to connect his waterline to the
Kings' waterline. The jury also determined that title
to the disputed Pine Creek water rights should not
be quieted in the Kings.
H 7 The trial court directed the Kings to prepare the
proposed judgment and order on the motions for
directed verdict. The Kings mailed copies of the
proposed judgment and order to Henshaw on May
4, 2006. Henshaw filed objections to them, which
were signed by counsel for Henshaw on May 15.
2006, but were not filed with the trial court until
May *880 18, 2006. The Kings responded to Henshaw's objections by filing a reply memorandum on
May 22, 2006. Prior to receiving Henshaw's objections, the trial court signed the proposed judgment
and order on May 15, 2006.
K 8 After trial but before the filing of the proposed
judgment and order, the Kings filed a Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. In an order
signed on June 15, 2006, the trial court denied the
Kings' motion. In the same order, the trial court
denied Henshaw's objections to the proposed judgment and order as untimely, but also stated that the
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proposed judgment and order "accurately reflect[ed] the [cjourt's ruling on the Motions for Directed Verdict, as well as the Verdict rendered by
the Jury."
K 9 On June 27, 2006, Henshaw filed a Motion to
Alter or Amend the Judgment, which the trial court
construed as a motion brought under rule 59(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.FN5 In an order
filed on September 13, 2006., the trial court denied
Henshaw's motion as untimely "because it was
served more than a month after the entry of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment." See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) (stating that u[a]
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than 10 days after entry of judgment").
FN5. Neither the motion nor the memorandum in support of it cited any rule as its
basis.
H 10 Henshaw then filed a "Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]" on September 28, 2006. In the motion's
supporting memorandum, Henshaw asserted that
the trial court had violated rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. R. 7(f)(2), as well
as Henshaw's rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The trial court issued a memorandum decision and order denying Henshaw's 60(b)
motion on November 15, 2006.
\ 11 On December 15, 2006, Henshaw filed a notice of appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] \ 12 Henshaw contends that the trial court
erred by granting the Kings' motion for directed
verdict. " '[I]n reviewing a grant of a directed verdict, we view all facts and the inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We reverse a directed verdict when
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the evidence [so viewed] is sufficient to permit a
reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.' " Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, \ 14, 981 P.2d 841
(citation omitted) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d
1260, 1261, 1263 (Utah 1993)).
[3] f 13 Henshaw also challenges the trial court's
denial of his motion for relief brought under rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. " 'A trial court has discretion in determining whether a
movant has shown [Rule 60(b) g rounds], and this
Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when
there has been an abuse of discretion.' " Lange v.
Eby, 2006 UT App 118, % 6, 133 P.3d 451
(alteration in original) (quoting Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, \ 9, 2
P.3d451).
U 14 Finally, the Kings argue that they are entitled
to their attorney fees on appeal under rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. SeeVtdh
R.App. P. 33(a) ("[I]f the court determines that a[n]
... appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous
or for delay, it shall award just damages ... and/or
reasonable attorney fees....").
ANALYSIS
I. Directed Verdict
[4] If 15 Henshaw's first claim on appeal is that the
trial court erred by granting the Kings' motion for
directed verdict. In its May 15, 2006 order on the
motions for directed verdict, the trial court ruled
that Henshaw failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was entitled through Raymond Watrous to use water from Pine Creek and
that he had an easement to connect his waterline to
the Kings' waterline for the purposes of irrigating
his property. The Kings argue that we lack jurisdiction to consider Henshaw's argument. We agree and
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hold that Henshaw's notice of appeal was untimely
with respect to his challenge to the directed verdict.
*881 f 16 According to rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, "the notice of appeal ...
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from." Id R. 4(a). Certain motions,
however, do toll the period in which a litigant must
file his notice of appeal. See id. R. 4(b)(1). Included
in the list of motions that toll the period for filing a
notice of appeal is "a motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure."/</. R. 4(b)(1)(C).
t 17Rule 4(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, however, requires that a rule 59 motion
be timely in order to extend the period in which a
litigant must file a notice of appeal. See id. R.
4(b)(1) (stating that "[i]f a party timely files in the
trial court any of the [enumerated] motions, the
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment
runs from the entry of the order disposing of the
motion" (emphasis added)); see also Nielson v.
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct.App.1994)
(stating that motion must be timely in order to extend period in which to file notice of appeal). Here,
the trial court entered the judgment and order on
the motions for directed verdict on May 15, 2006.
Henshaw filed his Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment on June 27, 2006.FN6 In a September 13,
2006 order, the trial court ruled that Henshaw's rule
59 motion was untimely because such a motion
must be served within ten days of the entry of the
order appealed. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 59(e) ("A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."). Thus, because Henshaw's rule 59(e) motion was untimely, the period for filing a notice of
appeal was not extended.
FN6. The motion and memorandum were
signed on June 23, 2006, but not filed until
June 27, 2006.
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If 18 Henshaw had thirty days in which to file an
appeal from the trial court's order on the motions
for directed verdict. SeeVtah R.App. P. 4(a). The
trial court entered the judgment and order on May
15, 2006. To be valid, the notice of appeal needed
to be filed by June 14, 2006. Henshaw, however,
did not file his notice of appeal until December 15,
2006. As such, it was untimely. See id.
[5] [6] Tf 19"If an appeal is not timely filed, this
court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Serrato
v. Utah Transit Auth, 2000 UT App 299, 1f 7, 13
P.3d 616; see also Nielson, 888 P.2d at 132 ("[W]e
cannot take jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. In
fact, *[w]hen a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action.' " (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreanx,
767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989)));
Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 616
P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984) ("It is axiomatic in this
jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal
is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the
appeal."). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review
Henshaw's challenge to the trial court's order on the
motions for directed verdict and dismiss the appeal
from that order.

Page 8

1f 21 Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that under specifically enumerated circumstances, a trial court may "relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The trial court
construed Henshaw's motion as a request for relief
under subsection (6) of rule 60(b), which allows a
court to grant relief for "any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment." Id. R.
60(b)(6).
| 22 Henshaw advances two main arguments in
support of his claim that the trial court erred by
denying his 60(b) motion. *882 First, he asserts that
the trial court should have granted his 60(b) motion
on the grounds that the court violated rule 7(f)(2) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. R.
7(f)(2), by signing the proposed judgment and order
on the motions for directed verdict prior to the expiration of Henshaw's time to object. Second, Henshaw challenges the trial court's conclusion that
Henshaw was not diligent in determining whether
the court had signed the proposed judgment and order. We discuss each argument in turn.
A. Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced- ure

II. Rule 60(b) Motion

[8] f 23Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure for service and filing
of proposed orders and objections thereto, and states:

[7] \ 20 Henshaw's second argument is that the trial
court erred by denying his motion under rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, seeUtah R.
Civ. P. 60(b). "[W]hen an order on a Rule 60(b)
motion is appealable, the appeal is narrow in scope
.... [and] addresses only the propriety of the denial
or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in
most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was sought." Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App
110, If 19, 2 P.3d 451 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed
order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the
order shall file the proposed order upon being
served with an objection or upon expiration of
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the time to object.
Id. (emphasis added). Henshaw contends that the
trial court signed the proposed judgment and order
on the motions for directed verdict prior to the expiration of his five-day period to object. According
to Henshaw, such conduct violated rule 7(f)(2) and
warranted relief under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. We disagree.
[9] \ 24 In order to succeed, Henshaw must show
that the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying his rule 60(b) motion. See Lange v. Eby, 2006
UT App 118, H 6, 133 P.3d 451. The trial court
signed the proposed judgment and order on
Monday, May 15, 2006. According to Henshaw, the
court could not sign the order until Tuesday, May
16, because Monday, May 15, was the last day in
which to file an objection. Even assuming, without
deciding, that Henshaw has properly calculated the
date by which his objection was due, we are not
convinced that the trial court erred by signing the
proposed order on May 15, 2006.
[10] \ 25 First, nothing in rule 7(f) requires the trial
court to wait for the expiration of a party's objection period prior to signing a proposed judgment or
order. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) ("The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon
being served with an objection or upon expiration
of the time to object."(emphasis added)). To the
contrary, Utah case law indicates that the rules pertaining to the entry of proposed judgments and orders are binding only on the litigants and not on the
trial court. In Tolboe Construction Co. v. Staker
Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah
1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that the rule
governing the signing of proposed orders was
"binding only upon counsel, not upon the trial
court." Id. at 849. In Tolboe, the appellant claimed
the trial court erred by signing proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law prior to the expiration
of the objection period. See id. at 848. The rule at
issue was rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the
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District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of
Utah^see id, which contained similar language
to current rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.™8 CompareUtah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2),
with Utah R. Practice 2.9(b) (1986) (repealed
1988). *883 The Utah Supreme Court held that the
trial court did not violate rule 2.9 because the rule
did not govern the actions of the court. See Tolboe,
682 P.2d at 849; see also Hoagland v. Hoagland,
852 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Utah Ct.App.1993)
(upholding challenged order because "the fact that
the judge may have signed the recommend[ed order] within the ten-day objection period does not
nullify the order, nor does it close off the objection
period"). Although Tolboe is not directly controlling of the instant case, we nonetheless find it
persuasive and conclude that the trial court did not
violate rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because that rule places no restrictions on
when a trial court may sign a proposed judgment or
order.
FN7. Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in
the District Courts and Circuit Courts of
the State of Utah stated: "Copies of the
proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders shall be served on opposing counsel
before being presented to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders.
Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to the court and counsel within (5)
days after service." Utah R. Practice 2.9(b)
(1986) (repealed 1988).
FN8. Indeed, rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice is the predecessor to rule 7(f)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, .seeUtah R.
Civ. P. 7(f)(2). Rule 2.9 was superseded by
rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, see Utah R. Jud. Admin.
4-504(2) (2002) (repealed 2003), which
contained similar language. See Utah R.
Practice 2.9(b) (Supp.1988). Rule 4-504(2)
was then repealed and its substance was
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added to rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure in 2003. See Utah R. Jud.
Admin. 4-501 to -509 (2004).
f 26 Further, we fail to see how the trial court's
signing of the proposed judgment and order prejudiced Henshaw. Cf. Tolboe, 682 P.2d at 849
(determining that party was not prejudiced by trial
court's signing of proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law prior to expiration of objection
period). The trial court ruled in its June 19, 2006
order that Henshaw's objections were untimely.
Nonetheless, in that same order the court addressed
the merits of Henshaw's untimely objections and
stated that the proposed order and judgment
"accurately reflected] the [cjourt's ruling on the
Motions for Directed Verdict, as well as the Verdict
rendered by the Jury ."Thus, Henshaw has not
shown how the alleged violation of rule 7(f)(2) prejudiced him in any way, and we reject Henshaw's
claim that he is entitled to relief because the trial
court violated that rule.FN9
FN9. Henshaw also argues that the trial
court violated his right to due process. We
disagree. As discussed above, the trial
court did not violate any rules applicable to
it. Furthermore, despite its belief that the
objections were untimely, the trial court
considered but rejected Henshaw's substantive challenge to the proposed order.
Consequently, Henshaw was heard on this
point. See Utah County v. hie, 2006 UT
33, f 22, 137 P.3d 797 ("The hallmarks of
due process are notice and an opportunity
to be heard, but not all proceedings demand the same level of process.").
B. Lack of Diligence
[11] f 27 Henshaw next contends that the trial court
erred when it denied his rule 60(b) motion on the
grounds that Henshaw was not diligent enough in
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determining whether the trial court entered its judgment on May 15, 2006. Specifically, Henshaw asserts that "there was no reason for either Mr. Henshaw or his attorney to assume that the trial court
had signed and entered [the proposed judgment and
order]." Henshaw also states that the Kings deliberately misled him into believing the trial court had
not signed the proposed judgment and order by responding to his objections. We hold that the trial
court did not exceed its discretion in denying Henshaw's 60(b) motion.
\ 28 In Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
2003 UT App 46, 68 P.3d 1008, we explained that
in order to obtain relief under rule 60(b)(6) based
on a claim of failure to receive notice of the entry
of judgment, "the moving party must ... show[ ] diligence in trying to determine whether judgment
had been entered or have been actually misled ... as
to whether there had been entry of judgment." Id. f
9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second omission in original). In Oseguera, the trial court had
entered a judgment sua sponte and without notifying the parties. See id. \ 4. As a result, Oseguera,
the losing party, missed the deadline for filing a notice of appeal and filed a rule 60(b)(6) motion. See
id. 1fl[ 5-6. The trial court denied Oseguera's motion.
See id. \ 6. We reversed on the grounds that the trial court "actually misled" Oseguera by setting a
scheduling conference and oral argument for the
same date the order was executed. See id. \ 11. Furthermore, because Oseguera had requested judgment in her favor and Farmers; Insurance had not requested judgment, "Oseguera had no reason to believe such a judgment [in favor of Farmers Insurance] could be forthcoming." Id.
\ 29 Here, on the other hand, Henshaw received
timely notice of the proposed judgment and order
on the motions for directed verdict. Henshaw also
knew that he had only five dziys in which to object.
Thus, Henshaw cannot claim that he was unaware
that the trial court might soon enter a judgment and
order. Furthermore, the record does not contain any
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evidence that the trial court, or the Kings, misled
Henshaw in any way. The mere filing of a response
to Henshaw's*884 objection does not demonstrate
any bad faith on the part of the Kings. Indeed, the
trial court specifically found that there was no evidence to support the allegations that the Kings had
intentionally misled Henshaw.FN1°
FN 10. On appeal, Henshaw has not challenged that finding.
[12][13] f 30 Although the present case is clearly
distinguishable from the facts in Oseguera, we reaffirm the generally accepted rule that the moving
parties in a 60(b)(6) motion asserting that they had
no notice of the trial court's judgment must show
either "diligence in trying to determine whether
judgment had been entered," or that they were
"actually misled ... as to whether there had been
entry of judgment." Id. \ 9 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original). Furthermore, "[o]ur rules ... put the burden on counsel to
check periodically with the clerk of the court as to
the date of entry of the findings and judgment so
that post-trial motions may be timely filed." Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780
P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1989) (holding that trial
court did not err by failing to notify counsel
promptly after signing findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment); see also West v. Grand
County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). Because
Henshaw failed to make such a showing, we conclude that the trial court did not exceed its discretion by denying Henshaw's rule 60(b) motion.
III. Attorney Fees
[14][15] If 31 Finally, the Kings assert that they are
entitled to attorney fees under rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure because Henshaw's
appeal is frivolous. We disagree. An appeal is
frivolous if it "is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith ar-
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gument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law."
Utah R.App. P. 33(b); see also O'Brien v. Rush, 744
P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ("A frivolous
appeal is one without merit."). Because Henshaw's
challenge to the denial of his 60(b) motion was not
wholly without merit, we deny the Kings' request
for attorney fees.FNn
FN11. In a single sentence at the end of
each of his briefs on appeal, Henshaw asks
for attorney fees on the grounds that he
prevailed on the Kings' quiet title claim
and that the Kings violated rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, seeUtah R.
Civ. P. 11. We decline to address this issue
because it is inadequately briefed. SeeUtah
R.App. P. 24(a)(9); Spencer v. Pleasant
View' City, 2003 UT App 379, \ 20, 80
P.3d 546 ("Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority."(internal
quotation marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION
If 32 We lack jurisdiction to consider Henshaw's appeal of the directed verdict because Henshaw's notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court did not
exceed its discretion by denying Henshaw's motion
brought under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Kings are not entitled to attorney
fees under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
133 Affirmed.
H 34 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Associate Presiding Judge.
f 35 I CONCUR, EXCEPT THAT AS TO PART
II.A, I CONCUR ONLY IN THE RESULT:
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
Utah App.,2007.
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE COUNTY
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479

BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW,
and DANA HENSHAW,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF JACK KING and
BONNIE KING,

Case No. 000600007
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee

Defendants.

The following motions are pending in this case: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate filed on
6 February 2008; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum filed on 5
March 2008; (3) Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions filed on 20 March 2008; and (4)
Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum filed on 27 May 2008.
All these motions, except for the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, have been fully briefed
and are now ready for a decision.
DECISION
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate should be denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File
Reply Memorandum should be granted. Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions should not
Memorandum Decision and Order
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be considered at this time. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum should be
granted.
ANALYSIS
A.

Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum and Motion to File Overlength

Memorandum:
The plaintiffs requested additional time to file a Reply Memorandum in support of their
Motion to Vacate. The plaintiflFs sought additional time in order to obtain a transcript of the trial.
However, the plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum on 27 May 2008, which was
approximately three months late. The plaintiffs did not obtain the transcript and did not file it in
support of their Reply.
Nevertheless, the Court is willing to consider the plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in
conjunction with its mling on the plaintiffs Motion to Vacate. To this extent, the plaintiflFs'
Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum should be granted.
Similarly, the Court finds the plaintiffs adequately explained their need to file an
overlength memorandum in reply to the defendant's opposition to the plaintiffs Motion to
Vacate. Therefore, the plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum should also be
granted.

HENSHAW v. KING, Case No. 000600007
Memorandum Decision and Order
Page 3

B.

Motion to Vacate:
The plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate is based on Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure. The Motion seeks a ruling voiding a portion of the directed verdict entered on 15
May 2006 against the plaintiffs. The basis advanced in support of this motion is that the
defendants did not have standing to argue that the water right in this case did not pass from
Raymond Waltrous to his wife.
A motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within a reasonable time. In this case, the
plaintiffs' current Motion was filed approximately 21 months after entry of the directed verdict,
after decision on other post-trial motions, and following an appeal. The Court concludes the
Motion is simply not timely because it was not filed within a reasonable time.
There can be no legitimate claim that standing is a new issue. Both parties agree the
plaintiffs argued the issue of standing at the time of trial. The plaintiffs also raised standing in
their Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed on 23 June 2006. The issue was again raised in
the plaintiffs' appellate brief filed sometime in December of 2006. However, the plaintiffs
waited until 6 February 2008 to bring this Motion to Vacate based on lack of standing.
The Court finds the plaintiffs' delay in raising this issue unreasonable. Thus, the
plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate should be denied as untimely.
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C.

Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions:
The defendants filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on 20 March 2008. The Certificate

of Mailing shows this Motion and the supporting memorandum were mailed to the plaintiffs'
attorney. The plaintiffs did not respond to this Motion, and the defendants filed a Request to
Submit for decision on 23 May 2008.
On 27 May 2008, the plaintiffs filed an Objection to Defendants' Request to Submit. In
the Objection, the plaintiffs stated they had never received the defendants' Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions. To date, the plaintiffs have still not filed a response to Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.
The Court is willing to give the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt that they did not receive
the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. Thus, it is premature to rule on this Motion.
The Motion and supporting memorandum are attached to this decision for the plaintiffs'
reference. The parties are directed to follow the briefing schedule in Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Either party may file a new request to submit for decision when the Motion is fully
briefed.
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate is denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply
Memorandum is granted. Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is not considered^
time. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum is granted.
DATED this

18 July

2008.

Wallace A Lee
WALLACE A. LEE, Judge

Digitally signed by Wallace A Lee
DN: cn=Wallace A Lee, c=US, o=TrustlD personal
certificate, ou=Utah, email=wlee@email.utcourts.gov
Reason: I am approving this document
Date: 2008.07.18 12:33:10 - 0 6 W
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tion, relying upon affidavits filed by the victim purporting to recant her previous trial testimony. After
conducting a hearing, the court found that the victim's recantation was not credible and that Vessey
failed to satisfy the standard for obtaining relief on
a claim of newly discovered evidence. SeeUtah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(e) (2002).
FNlSee State v. Vessey, 2000 UT App 220
(mem.) (Vessey 2 ); State v. Vessey, 967
P.2d 960 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (Vessey 1 );
State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239 (Utah
Ct.App.1998).
Vessey now appeals to this court, arguing that the
post-conviction court erred in refusing to grant his
petition for relief. "In deciding habeas appeals, we
review conclusions of law for correctness, according 'no deference to the lower court's conclusions."
' Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994)
(citation omitted).

Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
THORNE, J.
*1 Rodney A. Vessey II appeals from an order
denying his post-conviction relief petition. We affirm.

Vessey first claims that the post-conviction court
erred when it denied his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. A person is not eligible for relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act (PCRA), seeUtah Code Ann. §§ 78-3 5a-101 to
-304 (2002), upon any ground that "was raised or
addressed at trial or on appeal."/*/. §
78-35a-106(l)(b)."This rule applies to all claims,
including constitutional questions." Rudolph v.
Galetka, 2002 UT 7, \ 5, 43 P.3d 467.
In Vessey 2, this court reiterated that

Vessey was originally convicted of one count of
rape of a child. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 76-5-402.1
(2003). Having exhausted multiple claims on direct
appeal,™1 Vessey filed a post-conviction relief
petition on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, denial of due process, and newly discovered evidence. The post-conviction court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on Vessey's first two claims, but ordered an evidentiary
hearing on the newly discovered evidence conten-

in Vesseyf 1], we concluded that facts on the record
did not support Defendant's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, and that Defendant failed to
"allege[ ] specific facts outside the record to support his claim.'Thus Defendant's claim was adjudicated in Defendant's first appeal to this court, and
Defendant is not entitled to relitigate the issue on
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this second appeal.
State v. Vessey, 2000 UT App 220 (mem.)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). Because
Vessey's ineffective assistance of counsel claim has
already been addressed by this court, the postconviction court correctly determined that this
claim was procedurally barred.FmSee Pascnal v.
Carver, 876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994) (explaining
that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be asserted in petition for habeas corpus where
the claims either could have been raised on direct
appeal, or were fully and fairly adjudicated on direct appeal).
FN2. Vessey also argues that his ineffective assistance claim may avoid this procedural bar based on an exception to the law
of the case doctrine. The law of the case
doctrine provides that "when a legal decision is made on an issue during one stage
of a case, that decision is binding in successive stages of the same litigation."
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1
67, 82 P.3d 1076 (alteration omitted)
(citations and quotations omitted). An exception to the doctrine allows a judge to
fix mistakes and reconsider prior rulings in
the same case before a final decision has
been entered. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310-11 (Utah
Ct.App.1994). The doctrine is inapplicable
to this case because a final decision has
already been entered.
The law of the case doctrine recognizes
that it may be proper to review an issue
previously decided by a co-equal court
when the matter is presented in a
"different light" or under "different circumstances," as Vessey now claims.
State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 n. 2
(Utah Ct.App.1993) (quotations omitted). Here, again, the law of the case
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doctrine is inapplicable because the postconviction court was not reviewing a decision of a co-equal court, but was following the express ruling of this court
that Vessey was not entitled to relitigate
his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Vessey also claims that the post-conviction court
abused its discretion by not allowing Vessey to
present evidence of an alleged violation of the exclusionary order at his trial. Vessey raised this issue
on his direct appeal and this court refused to address the issue, stating that "defendant failed to object to these alleged errors during the trial and has
not demonstrated on appeal that they were plain error." State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah
Ct.App.1998). As with Vessey's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, his claimed error regarding the exclusionary order had already been decided
on direct appeal, and therefore was procedurally
barred. See Pascual, 876 P.2d at 366.
*2 Finally, Vessey argues that he is entitled to relief on a claim of newly discovered evidence based
on four affidavits filed by the victim, allegedly recanting her prior trial testimony. Vessey's only argument for relief under the newly discovered evidence prong of the PCRA was that "viewed with all
the other evidence, the newly discovered material
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of
fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received."Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(e)(iv). The postconviction court held a hearing on Vessey's claims
relating to the credibility of the affidavits and recantation, and determined that the victim's affidavits and evidentiary hearing testimony were not
credible and that "substantial evidence contradicts,
refutes, or otherwise casts doubt on [the victim's]
affidavits and evidentiary hearing testimony ."
We see no error in the post-conviction court's determination. Given the overwhelming amount of
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evidence pointing towards Vessey's guilt, particularly in light of the post-conviction court's finding
concerning the credibility of the victim's recantation, it is impossible to say that the affidavits
demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could
have found Vessey guilty of the offense. Significant
evidence was presented at the post-conviction hearing that refuted the victim's affidavits and evidentiary hearing testimony. Further, testimony at the
hearing corroborated the victim's earlier trial testimony and allegations. Based on these findings, the
affidavits do not warrant a new trial and Vessey's
post-conviction relief petition was properly denied.
See State v. Hofftiine, 2001 UT 4, \ 28, 20 P.3d 265
(holding that victim's recantation was not sufficient
as new evidence to warrant a new trial); State v.
Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 18, 994 P.2d 1237 (holding
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial based on a letter written
by the victim which allegedly recanted her trial
testimony). Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding
Judge, GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
Utah App.,2005.
Vessey v. State
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 3498367 (Utah
App.), 2005 UT App 548
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